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Artificial Intelligence Revisited 
R. W. Hamming 
(date) 
Prologue 
The idea that machines can be used to do various human activities bas a long history. 
Most or the early work has concentrated on the physical side or human activities and we now 
have many machines that amplify the human muscles that once did the corresponding jobs. The 
rise or the digital computer bas raised the similar question or duplicating, and amplifying more or 
less, the activities or the human mind. 
In 1972 Dreyfus published a book What Computera Can~ do - the limita of artificial intel-
ligence, in which he attacked not only what bad been done in the Oeld or Al, but also the under-
lying models he thought bad been :issumed by the workers in the 6eld. There was enough truth 
in what he wrote to cause many or us not to enter the field at that time. 
While I feel that the reasoning Dreyrus gives is often unconvincing and he is talking about 
the wrong problem (which be bas invented for himi;elr to demolish) it does not follow that bis 
conclusions are wrong. l seem unable to talk my15eJC out or the feeling that. we may have to come 
to terms with the vague concepts or "ideas" and "meaning" before we can make much progress 
in many direct.ions. But it is at the engineering level, not the philosophical level, that we must 
understand them. We often have engineered what we did not understand at the time we did it. 
What little I understand or "semantic nets" in Al indicates that they have the right words but 
the wrong approach. "Undersl:loding" is tor me a matter or degree and not a matter or com· 
plete, absolute understanding as it is for Dreyfus. 
The appearance or "knowledge engineering" and its economic successes (limited though 
they are as yet in theoretical abilities) means that AI will have money available. While econom-
ics is not the exclusive rorce in the practical world, it is a very central one. It is one that requires 
attention or those who have to deal directly with Al. It is a rorce that even the more remote 
theoreticians should pay attention to. Jr the mon<>y is going to be spent, the theoreticians have 
an obligation to provide some wisdom to guide the choices made in the dispersal or the limited 
funds. It behooves us all to try to understand: 
What can we do? 
What are we trying to do? 
What are the long term possibilities! 
What are the likely rruitrul paths vs. the dead ends! 
What is a reasonable balance between short and long term goals! 
What is the arsenal or tools available? 
What are the measures to apply to various projects! 
How can we get the amplification into new areas or the human mind that in the 
long run seems most important! · 
Advantagea of Computen 
I once read "The battlefield is no place ror a human.11 and it applies much more widely U 
you interpret. "battlefield" to mean a place or st.rcss and at.rain. Among the advantages ror com-
put.ers a11 compared to humans are: 
(1) Speed. M3chines have signaling and signal processing 11pecd11 well over 1000 times that or 
the human nervous system. 
(2) Accuracy. Ir you want high accuracy, then the human, having a large component or ana-
log, cannot compare with a basically digital machine. 
(3) Reliability. Even comparatively slow machines these days corpute in less than a 
microsecond, so that an hour's computation ~ocs over 3.6xl0 op~ations. For a human 
lifetime or 100 years there are about 3.14xl0 &econds, and we make many, many mi!takes 
in that time! There is also the Jack of emotioDS that favors the reliable machine operation. 
Finally, a comparable thing, the machine is far more dependable tbao is a human. 
(4) Environment. The human must be supplied time for rest, sleep, space for Jiving, vacations, 
)eave from duty 1 pensions, time to take Care Of per&on!ll emergencies 3.5 a death in the fam-
ily, recreation and corresponding facilities, food, oxygen, temperature control within close 
limits, etc:, while the computer needs less environmental control and only a modest amount 
or electrical power to keep running. Both have need for repair facilities, but hospitals tend 
to be larger and more expensive than repair shops, and the people to run hospitals are 
more highly trained. 
(5) Freedom from boredom. A machine can be given the task to do ror years and stilJ keep at 
it, say the detection or some expected signal, while humans are simply not able to do such 
things ror long times with high reliability. 
(6) Bandwidth. In situations that have a large amount or high speed input and output, the 
b:indwidth or a machine lets the information get in and out while the very limited 
bandwidth of humans cannot compare. No General, Admiral, or Executive can digest and 
emit the quantity or information that a machine can handle. 
(7) Retraining. When circumstances change, (in the battle field analogy a new weapon 
becomes av:iilable), the typical human must be untrained ror the previous one and trained 
for the new one, while the program in the machine need only be changed. 
(8) Taking care of the machine. It is far simpler to take care or machines than humans. Many 
of these points were given in the environment 'i.rt but there are also personal squabbles, 
"" moodiness, personal reelings when things must be changed, prestige, etc, that do not apply 
to machines. A 
1 
Dl11advantage. of computera. V"JL r 
/ 
The disadvantages of computers with respect to humans are often listed under "common 
sense and an inability to cope with a wide range or various circumstances.0 Given the previous 
list or advantages it is obvious that we must work on the problems or decreasing the disadvan-
tages in various ways. This 6eld bas often been called Artificial Intelligence, but in view or a 
close analysi! or the results achie\•ed so rar it might better be called "Artifice Intelligence" 
because the past successes are generally based on discovering some artifice that bandies the par-
ticular situation. This is strikingly apparent as you reread Dreyfus's book "What Computers 
Can't Do" 
Dreyfus docs mention the "Cognitive Science" branch or this sort or work (aa an attempt 
to escape the labeling or Al) but does not think th:it much has been done, and it docs seem that 
that bandwagon has died down in its claims. The current bandwagon is "Expert Systems" or 
"Information Engineering." It is not clear to me, looking at the current literature in the field, 
how far they have advanced beyond "artifice intelligence", to what extent there is generality 
behind the wild claims. That all is not as claimed is dear from the fact that they still build 
expert systems which fail to work satisfactorily. Or course some of them are very successful, but 
each time it seems to me that they found an area of application that was capable of being organ-
ized by a mixture or algorithms, rules and heuristics in a practical engineering way; they round 
another artifice. 
The subtitle or Dreyfus's book is 11The Limits or Artificial Intelligence". A! such it pro-
duced a lot of discussion in computing cirdes. The opening part devastatingly cites past perfor-
mance and was highly resented by the practitioners or AI. Truth is often painful. But when you 
go on to read the later parts where the subtitle is discul!Sed you find a philosopher in action. It 
is all couched in philosophical jargon, and it is by my count filled with extremist words like 
"completely, must agree, aU." As a random example or bis style "It is a' question or whether 
there can be rules even describing what speakers in /ad do." A! opposed to his requirements, 
science is quite content to ftud approximate descriptions that work some or the time - we simply 
do not expect the all encompassing certainty and infallibility he is constantly talking about. We 
do not expect real people to have such abilities as he demands or artificial intelligence in 
machines. 
Appendix A gives some other reasons why I think that he bas been so systematically 
ignored by AI people, though there is a lot of truth in what be says. Therefore, the rest or this 
report is an attempt to say those parts or what be was saying in more acceptable language while 
trying to avoid his extremism, jargon and errors. 
ldeu 
Since the defect in computers centers around the lack of common sense, it is necessary to 
analyze this trait more closely. At present many workers in AI seem to think that this trait can 
be endowed to programs by giving the richer background or data that the average per11on seems 
to have. However, the size of this background body of data is appalling, even to them! Simi-
larly the computing time to use it rapidly approaches inOnity! 
As I analyze many of my experiences during my thirty years at BTL I find that the failure 
or the common sense was often (not always) a Jack or understanding the meaning behind the 
words. The difference between what is "meant" and "what is said" is paidully clear to pro-
grammers who constantly find that in spite or all their efforts to be clear the machine does what 
it is told rather than wh:it was meant. Jt is clear that humans deal in meaning when communi-
cating with each other. But as I see it "meaning" involves the concept of idea. 
Suppose, ror purposes or an analogy, I want to send a picture to you via television. The 
picture is scanned according to a given set or rules to produce a time signal, generally in the 
form or an electrical signal. You use this signal to reconstruct the picture according to the aame 
rulea. The time signal is not the picture in any reasonable sense, though it does contain the 
information to reconstruct the picture. Operating on the time signal to transform the picture, as 
a picture, is a very unlikely way to get userul results. 
Now suppose I want to send you an idea I have in my head. I must put the idea into a 
time sequence signal, either spoken or written words. 
The stream or words is not the idea! Furthermore, unlike television we do not have a rigid 
set of rules for connrting an idea to words. lodeed, on successive days I may well encode the 
(apparently) same idea into different streams or words. More certainly, if you try to send the 
idea on to others you will use a dill'erc.>nt encoding or the idea. Clearly people with dilJerent 
linguistic backgrounds use difrl'rent languages to communicate very similar (if not identical) 
ideas. Thus it is fooUsh to assume that the words are the idea, that operating on the words is a 
way to process ao idea. 
1 
1J 
We simply do not know what ideas are. It is convenient to talk as if they were definite 
things, but probably they are more like clouds, having amorphous shapes that change with time 
and point or view. We do not know bow they are represented in our minds, nor have much idea 
bow they could be represented in computers, yet they are the main basis for communication and 
apparently for thinking! 
When we venture into an examination of the ideas we think that there are a large number 
or them - it is hard to estimate the total number since we are not sure what. an idea is or when 
one idea blends into another or when they are distinct, but. we are sure that there are a lot of 
diO'erent ideas. Typical estimates are between one thousand and one million. 
We believe that man is the result or long evolution, and that generally speaking the result 
of evolution is an efficient mechanism for dealing with the world through which man evolved. 
What little we know or organizations and their management strongly suggests that one boss can-
not supervise thousands or others, that a number around 5 to 10 subordinates i5 the usual 
branching in the organization chart. Hence the belier that somehow the mind directly manages 
thousands or perhaps many millions or ideas seems likely to be false: the mind would probably 
be organized with quite a few levels of management.! And it would take time to go through each 
level to recover the idea. In short, the classical way we manage many things does not seem to be 
an appealing model for what little we think we know about the mind and ideas. 
There is, fortunately, at least one other model. Instead or having stored away in the mind 
the perhaps millions or ideas, which does perhaps put quite a burden on the storage mechanisms 
evolution bad to develop, the mind builds the ideas out or smaller parts, somewhat as we have 
gradually round that the molecules are combinations or atoms, which are combinations or smaller 
parts, etc., until we are now working on bow the three kinds or quarks are combined to get the 
next l:uger parts. It has taken years and years or physics to get beneath the larger particles to 
the components or them. I suspect. that similarly it will take a long time to get beneath the 
apparent unity of ideas to anything resembling their components. But it aeems unlikely that an 
efficient mechanism can handle all the different ideas we seem to have without some structure 
imposed on the total mechanism. The use or smaller parts to construct the larger parts seems 
more likely to me than a hierarchy of tree search management. 
We also know that, as in an ant. bill, many apparently complex things are done with many 
simple parts reacting in simple ways to a complex environment or input stimuli. The apparent 
complexity is in a sense a result or the complex stimuli rather than the complexity or the device. 
We also know that reliability in complex systems is ~sential, that a system or checks and 
balances is required to prevent catastrophies. But the mind does not work with uniform absolute 
reliability, rather we see that often small slips occur, sometimes larger ones, and t.hat when a slip 
occurs it tends to persist for some time. For example, a slip in algebra on my part is apt to be 
repeatf'd when immediately checking the work, but is apt to be found if the checking is done 
much later. This suggests the reconstruction approach to ideas. 
Another curious aspect or the human mind is the need for sleep. Experiments seem to 
show rather clearly that the mind needs sleep much more than the body does. There is a current 
conjecture I.hat. sleep is needed to remove l.emporary and false connections that have arisen dur-
ing the course or the day. It is plausible at best. Since the mind deals, so I am implying, with 
ideas and meanings, it is one more possible clue towards getting some conception or what we 
mean by ideas and bow we represent, process, and transmit ideas. Dreams are another aspect or 
the minds or humans and animals. Whether or not these two phenomena are relevant to a 
theory or understanding ideas remains to be seen; they are, or course, relevant t.o any detailed 
model or the human mind. 
Furthermore, we believe most or the time that the actua1 signaling system is a mixed 
digital-analog system, with a number or curious, not well understood additional features. 
Although we do not know how the mind works, or just what ideas are, we can try to apply 
some engineering principles we know with regard to complex systems; we are not completely 
helpless in this confusing situation. 
In summary, we use ideas as a means or communkation but we have very little idea of 
what we mean by ideas. We see clearly that the words we use are not the ideas, but rather are 
temporary encodings we use to communicate ideas. We generally communicate in terms or ideas, 
and when driven to words, as we are in programming a computer or giving instructions to much 
lower levels in the organization, we find it very hard not to be misunderstood. The encoding sys-
tems are dilJerent and in the case of the computer there is no "meaning., being sent, there is no 
"idea0 being transmitted to the computer. 
Epilogue 
One observes that people walk, but we do not regard man as a walking machine. Similarly, 
we observe that at times man processes information, but it is similarly wrong to conclude that 
man is an information processing machine. The processing or information is merely one aspect or 
man that bas been selected by long evolution for the survival of the species. 
For the sake of discussion we are assuming that man works in terms or ideas, but how sure 
are we! Could all this business or ideas be illusion? Without gdting deep into philosophy, what 
"sure" evidence do we have? Descartes started with, "I think, therefore I am ... After long medi-
tation on the matttrs I have come to the feeling that my sense of self-awareness and or self-
consciousoess (if they are different) is too strong to be denied or be talked out of (though I have 
tried to do so many times}. Free will may be an illusion or the individual, but self-awareness and 
self-consciousness seem to be real artifacts. 
lf8o, what evolutionary value do they have! When did they arise in the chain or evolu-
tion? It is probably unproductive to think that they are yes-no situations, but rather are 
matters or degree. It is called anthropomorphism to project our feelings onto animals, but we 
project our feelings of self-awareness onto others! Thus I do not mind projecting some degree of 
&f'lf-awareness and self-consciousness onto my cat as I observe him walk into a room full or peo-
ple, or examine bis behavior wbf'n he has slipped in a jump or made some other ~oof. I see in bis 
actions evidence to project my reelings onto him, though to a !easer degree than I believe I have. 
What relationship do these feelings have with respect to idea.-., meaning, and thinking? 
Probably ideas bad prior existence to words - the realiiationpor danger preceded the voicing or 
the sound. But the feeling of danger seems to imply a aetr-awareness or the danger. 
This is not the only approach to creating a theory of ideas, it is only one of many possible 
approaches. The evolutionary approach bas in the past proved to be very powerful in under-
standing the present, not only in human evolution but in the social evolution of organizations, 
and socidy. From this approach of asking what. is the evolutionary value of ideas with their 
apparently associated meanings, we may come closer to understanding what it is that man does 
as be processes information. 
It does not follow that when we create programs to run on our machines that are to simu-
late the information processing of humans that we will do it in the same way as humans do. The 
history or technology shows that although man walks while carrying burdens, most or the time 
we use devices that have wheels. Nature apparently never invented the wheel in the chain or 
evolution, but it dominates our technological world. Similarly, the study of birds and flying did 
not produce an airplane that flaps its wings. It does not even follow that we must ftrst under-
stand bow man does it before we can get machines to do similar things. Generally speaking, we 
do not with our technology attempt the exact duplication or the human - rather we try to get 
gruter performance than the human i.s capable or doing! 
'· Indeed, it does not follow that we must even understand what we want to do before we can 
do ii on a computer. Jn tbe field or Quantum Mechanics we have an example or a formal body 
.. 
or knowledge which we do not pretend to understand. We know, more or less, bow to operate 
the formalism or Quantum Mechanics, but in the more than 50 years since the rise or the modern 
theory no one bas seriously pretended to understand the wave-particle duality. We merely "get 
used to it0 aa the teacher says, and they cover; it over with the glib expression or complemmtar-
itu. 
In summary, there are a number or approaches to the problem of writing programs for ~ 
computers that will amplify man's abilities in the world@deaa and meaning. You can try to . 
understand in detail how man does it, you can try to analyze the problem (lib transportation or 
heavy loads) and get some working solution or a somewhat similar problem. And there is the 
blind attack th3t tries without understanding to create something that "works". While it seems 
wise to at least attempt to first two before trying the third, it may be only the third approach 
that will work . ' 
Why do I fear that this may be the only successful approach? I am prepared (baaed on 
Godel's incompleteness theorem which is not about mathematics but is about symbol manipulat-
ing systems) to believe that there are unthinkable thoughts. There are smells that I cannot smell 
(unaided), there are sounds I cannot bear (unaided) tht're are tastes I cannot taste, 110 why not 
thoughts I cannot think? Watching a dog out for a walk as be dashes here and there smelling 
his way around, I have no reeling for what is in his mind • his thoughts are apparently unthink-
able by me. Surely the Quantum Mechanics wave-particle quality is a good candidate for a 
Godel-like unl.hiokable thought. But ir m3chioe programs are to supplement human thoughtt 
then this is perhaps the most promising field for a payom It is the human- computer program 
thm that in the long run that we care about. Yes, sclr-standiog robots are ust'rul, yes, the 
duplication or parts or human activities are useful as both t'Xploratory experiments, and 
verifications that we have a partial understanding or wht we set out to do, but the great goal ia 
the man-machine team. 
.. 
APPENDIX A 
Why baa Dreyfus been so systematically ignored? 
The first, most obvious reason is that. he so directly denied that which many people in Al 
were trying to do, could be done. Certainly bia devastating analysis in the first part or the book, 
(and in the introduction to the second edition which updated the first part or the original edi-
tion) or what Al had claimed but had not done, was very embarrassing. But I think that it waa 
his systematic use or philosophy. its jargon and patterns or reasoning, the later parts or the tools 
that "turned people ofr". No doubt to argue to absolute conclusions you have to make absolute 
statements and models. Science simply does not do this! Note that to this day Quantum 
Mechanics bas not been given a postulational basis, and many able physicists have loudly 
asaerted that they do not want it to be so treated. This is a clear recognition that science is not 
basically logical deduction from postulates, it is a larger matter or doing ecience in a sensible 
fashion. 
Philosophers setm to live in a disembodied world or their own that bas little relation to 
what most of us do from day to day. They think that the probleme of Al are to create things in 
thei~ philosophical world, while practicing workere in Al are trying to match, in practical ways, 
what goes on in their world of human falibility. 
But there are other reasons why Al people would justly ignore his efforts. The reputation 
or philosophy ia, for most scientist&, very low. It baa all too justly been said that i1 you point 
your Unger at reality the modern philoeopher will aulyse your 6oger. They have apparently 
become lost in the analysis or words and have forgotten reality. It has also been eaid that philo-
sophy is a collection or words especially invented to make the obvious obscure, and there ia some 
justice in this observation. 
1 1 p It is easy to obeerve that the various echools or philosophy often Batly contradict each 
~ 
1 
j o ther, and apparently there bas never been an accepted way of selecting among them. Science 
'i, bas the theoretical standard of the final appeal to experiment, though in practice it is not an 
i..Y absolute standard. Thus the results of philosophy are highly suspect to the scientist - it is all 
1 ~ T"- words! 
.,J. ~ ~ { Dreyfus makes a big point that two systems (human and&"d Al program) that. produce the 
,').. t' ~ same outputs for the same inputs need not be at all the same. or course; and we can never N ~ ......._ ~ know that the models we create in science (and philosophy) agree with reality. The observation 
j l l ~ is irrelevant. 
... ~ .. ~ From reading Dreyfus it seems that philo11opbers deal in absolutes, whereas science is much 
\ - more modest and thinks that the "rules" are useful guides to be used· and we actively look for (\ ~--~~ 
~ f situations where we are wrong. 
f ~ ~ ~ Dreytus bas the gene-r~I knowledge of science you would expect from a philosopher. He 
~ ~I'{ ~ citee, for example, "Wittgenstein was perhaps the first philosopher since Pascal to note: •10 gen-
) ~ ~ eral we don't uae language according to etrict rules - it hasn't been taught to us by means or 
~ · strict rulrs either.' " It is a sad c:ommentary on philosophy that they seem not to look at reality 
~ '3 ~ · and note such obvious things that every child knows. 
The density of words in the later parts of the book like, completely, must agree, all, ia very 
high. For example 11 ••• everything essential to intelligent behavior must in principle be under-
standable in terms of a seL of determinate independent elements ... " Science is quite content to 
&nd approximate descriptions that work some of the time - we simply do not expect the all 
encompat1sing, certainty and infalibility be is conetantly talking about. We simply do not expect 
any real ptrson to have such abilities. Dreyfus seems to have no conception or the nature of pro-
bability and variability in the world. Reality and absolutes have little in common aa far as the 
scientist. is concerned, but apparently philosophers argue only in terms of ab~olutes, musts, 
exhaustively analysed, etc. These are but some or the reasons that Dreyfus' book is almost 




ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE - 2 
We now look much more closely at the details of how machines are made to do some of 
the things we talked about in the previous lecture. First, we review what we know about the 
details of a computer. The elementary parts are AND and OR gates and such simple devices 
which process digital pulses (or voltages) and produce further pulses. Such parts have no 
memory, attach no meaning to the pulses, do none of the things we regard as thinking. But then 
we believe that our minds are made of simple parts called neurons. While neurons a.re much more 
complex than are simple gates and other devices, they seem (to us at present) to be the parts 
from which our bra.in is built. The neurons may have some storage capacity for information, as 
does the storage device in the computer, but what goes on inside ourselves is not at all clear. 
Second, we recall that at a higher level the computer makes decisions, but these are 
merely putting a number into the current address register rather than advancing it by one digit 
~ore. The computer itself merely repeats endlessly the cycle of: (1) fetch the address of the next 
i\lstruction from the current address register, {2) use this address go to the storage device and get 
t~e instruction to do next, (S) carry out this instruction, and (4) either adv!lllce the current 
ad_dress register by 1 or else put some other number there. If machines "think" then thinking must 
be merely a large number of these primitive steps. But are we humans so different? We simply do 
not know! It is ha.rd to believe that some of the things we feel are "thinking" are reducible to 
sue~ simplicity. We therefore turn to how a large number of simple steps can give the appearance 
of c~plexity. 
Consider arithmetic in the abstract. We use the simple rules of add, subtract, multiply, 
divide, and square root, to compute many complex situations. They are the basis of the computa-
tions of. complex space orbits for example. Much of science and engineering is ultimately based on 
a lot of fimple arithmetic. It is in the organization of the arithmetic that the complexity arises to 
give the answers to complex questions rather than in the complexity of the simple operations of 
arithmetic. 
The set of rules of a computation are called, collectively, an algorithm. An algorithm 
must cover all the possible cases that can arise and be guarenteed to stop. This last is not trivial; 
we cannot afford in principle to let a machine go on endlessly. Actually we write programs, such 
as monitor systems, which have no ending, since when one job is done the program searches for 
the next and when it find it that job is processed. It takes human intervention to end a monitor 
program. Still, most of the programs we use must have a definite ending, which iB included in the 
definition of 1an algorithm. 
Ther~ are broadly speaking two kinds of algorithms for dealing with problems. The siJn-
p]est ones are definite processes which are sure to solve the problem. The other kind are called 
heuristic algorithms which as their name implies are not certain of solving the problem but try a 
number of promising approaches before quitting. We will look briefly at one of the definite kind, 
and then examine a bit more closely the heuristic algorithms. Both are highly developed fields 
and we can but touch on them in this lecture. 
A good example of a definite algorithm is the "critical path" algorithm for scheduling 
work that is tightly interrelated. The classic example is the construction of a submarine (where it 
has paid off handsomely in the past). The nature of the task is that there are many stages of par-
tial assemblage which must be done in some order, some must be done before others can be 
started. We begin with a graph of these dependencies which must of course come from experience 
and a study of the whole assemblage process. The attached figure is a highly simplified such 
diagram which is to be read from left to right. Next, the times to complete each process, the 
lines, arc estimated carefully and )'OU see these time estimAtes along the arrows. This diagram 
describes the assembly job and the expected tim~ to completion. Such a chart is often called a 




We start on the right with the dAy we want the completion, node 10 in the figure. We 
next project that time back lo nodes 8 and 9 and have the latest dates they can be completed. 
These two nodes 11.re projected back. At node 7 both meet and we must take the ea.rliest date as 
the time that node 7 must be completed . We project back ea.ch definitely dated node and at any 
node where all the consequences have been project back we take the earliest date. In this fashion 
we continue until we are backed up to node 11 the starting dllle when the project must be started . 
Below each node we find the dale al which it must be started , and when we get to the starting 
node we have the starting date. But we have more that that. By noting which was the ea.rliest 
time we have the critical path, the path along which any slippage will result in a delay or the 
whole project. Thus management knows where in the whole complex process (and in prActice the 
PERT chart is far more complex) lo watch closely. 01her paths can let some slippage occur, but 
none ma.y be permitted along the critical path. Of course when new data comes in as to partial 
completion dates, and slippage on some, new critical paths emerge and the attention is focused 
other places. 
The effecLiveness of the PERT cha.rt is that both management watches the critical parts 
and can tend to ignore the less critical, 11.nd that the very watching tends to speed up the work 
along the critical path. The workers know that they are on the critical path so then tend to work 
more rapidly and more carefully. The net result is that in many cases the "hole task is com-
pleted in much less time than was estimated. 
Look at how simple is the program in the computer that each day, or oftener, produces 
the critical path. Indeed, it is so simple that one wonders why the method waited until the 
development of computers to be .widely used. Here you have an example of the computer formal-
izing and making more efficient various methods that were more or less intuitively used in the 
past. The algorithm is perfectly definite, one knows how to compute the critical path in every 
case. 
We now turn to a heuristic ali;orithm. We take the game of three dimensional tic-tac-toe 
as an example of a game that is widely known and has no known strategy for guaranteeing a win 
for the first player. We assume that you are fa.miliar with the game played on the 4x4x4 three 
dimensional board. A natural strategy for you when your turn occurs is to: 
J. If you have three in a line and the fourth space is blank, then play the blank and you win. 2. 
If not the first, then if the opponent has three in a line then you had best block that or else he 
will win. S. Next, if you have a fork, two lines intersecting in a common blank point and you 
have two men on ea.ch line, t.hen play the fork as the opponent ca.nnot block Loth of them. 4. If 
you have no forks, then bloc* any forks the opponent may have. 5. You might now consider forc-
ing moves which are two men on a line with the other two blank, ~ince playing one place forces 
lines, are estimated carefully and you see these time est imates along the arrows. This diagram 
describes the assembly job and the expected time to completion. Such a chart is often called a 
PERT chart from Programmed Evaluation Review Technique. 
I 
We start on the right with the day we want the completion, node 10 in the figure. We 
next project that time back to nodes 8 and 9 and have the latest dates they can be completed. 
These two nodes are projected back. At node 7 both meet and we must take the earliest date as 
the time that node 7 must be completed. We project back each definitely dated node and at any 
node where all the consequences have been project back we take the earliest date. In this fashion 
we continue until we are backed up to node 1, the starting date when the project must be started . 
Below each node we find the date at which it must be started, and when we get to the starting 
node we have the starting date. But we have more that that. By noting which was the earliest 
time we have the critical path, the path along which any slippage will result in a delay of the 
whole project. Thus management knows where in the whole complex process (and in practice the 
PERT chart is far more complex) to watch closely. Other paths can let some slippage occur, but 
none may be permitted along the critical path. Of course when new data comes in as to partial 
completion dates, and slippage on some, new critical paths emerge and the attention is focused 
other places. 
The effectiveness of the PERT chart is that both management watches the critical parts 
and can tend to ignore the less critical, and that the very watching tends to !!peed up the work 
along the critical path. The workers know that they are on the critical path so then tend to work 
more rapidly and more carefully. The net result is that in many cases the whole task is com-
pleted in much less time than was estimated. 
Look at how simple is the program in the computer that each day, or oftener, produces 
the critical path. Indeed, it is so simple that one wonders why the method waited until the 
development of computeri; to be widely used. Here you have an example of the computer formal-
izing and making more efficient various methods that were more or less intuitively used in the 
past. The algorithm is perfectly definite, one knows how to compute the critical path in every 
case. 
We now turn to a heuristic algorithm. We take the game of three dimensional tic-tac-toe 
as an example of a game that is widely known and has no known strategy for guaranteeing 11. win 
for the first player. We assume that you are familiar with the game played on the 4x4x4 three 
dimensional board. A natural strategy for you when your t urn occurs is to: 
1. H you have three in a line 11.nd the fourth space is blank, then play the blank and you win. 2. 
H not the first, then if the opponent has three in a line then you had best block that or el!!e he 
will win. S. Next, if you have a fork, two lines intersecting in a common blank point and you 
have two men on each line, t.hen play the fork as the opponent cannot block both of them. 4. If 
you have no forks, then blodt any forks the opponent may have. 5. You might now consider fore· 
ing moves which are two men on a line with the other two blank, ~ince playing one place forces 
the opponent to block your threatened win on the next move. But where to play your man, 
which of the two blanks? H you see a sequence of forcing moves that lead to a win, of curse fol-
low them. But if not, then the observation (especially useful in the opening moves when there are 
no immediate threats) is to note that the eight center positions and the eight corner positions 
have more lines through them than do the other positions. Hence playing men there gives you 
more chances for 11. winning combination than do the other positions. 
We note that the first four rules are definite but that the fifth is heuristic in the sense 
that it sounds plausible but it is not guaranteed to win for you. 
There are many situations in which we do not know the winning moves to make, but 
there are heuristics to guide us. Also it may happen that while we know 11. winning strategy it is 
too expensive to use. Thus in playing chess we know a winning strategy: project a move forward, 
all the possible responses of the opponent, then your possible responses, etc. until the game ends. 
Pick that path which does not let your opponent have a win, but gives you one. The difficulty is 
that no machine now available, or imaginable in a practical sense in the immediate future could 
make all those projections in your lifetime! Thus in playing chess we are forced to adopt heuristic: 
approaches. When we have two alternate choices of about the same value {so far as we can see at 
the moment) we often use a random choice which prevents the opponent from slowly exploring 
game after game searching for a weakness to exploit. The random choices mean that the algo-
rithm will produce different games when the opponent uses the same sequence of plays. It also 
mea.ns that we can do as the checker learning game did, we can make small changes in the con-
stants of the algorithm and play one formula against the other searching for improvements. The 
difficulties of this are apparent if you know the story of the monkeys and the typewriters which 
claims that in sufficient time the monkeys will produce all the books in the British Museum in the 
order they are on the shelves! The argument goes as follows. There is a finite, though small pro-
bability that a monkey will hit the first key right. Indeed in the infinity of time (being supposed) 
this will happen infinitely often. or these infinite number of successes, there is a finite probability 
that the second key will be the correct one. And so it goes. The difficulty is, of course, the 
length of time needed! May of the proposa.ls to solve problems comes down to a variant of the 
monkeys and the typewriters. You should always suspect that a random search for something has 
this element of impossibly long times to success. 
Games were attacked first in artificial intelligence because they do not involve handling 
the real world (which is very hard), and are both clearly stated both in rules and in goal. In real 
life it is seldom that what we want to do is so clearly stated, nor are the rules which must be used 
so clearly stated. Life, in practice, is messy! however, games have provided a valuable tool for 
exploring the heuristic approach to problems. 
A currently popular field if AI is ca.lled intelligence bases. The original idea., longt long 
ago was that by supplying a few, possibly five, genera.I rules for problem solving, and then supply-
ing the details of the particular field of application we would be able to solve many different 
kinds of problems. Well, it did not work! The next time this general approach was used the 
belief was that maybe fifty special rules for solving problems would be necessary. Still late the 
number was raised to 500, then to 51000, Currently the expert data base can have up to 50,000 
items of expert knowledge. Some seem to work, and some do not! When they do work, and you 
examine the whole closely you generaly find that the situation is indeed rather "mechanical". 
But then if there were any algorithms of the kinds we generaly use, then we would indeed con-
clude that it was a mechanical situation solva.ble by mechanical rules, In spite of claims to the 
contrary, and 11.. lot of highly publicized exa.mples, we seem not to know how to write programs 
that exhibit intelligence. 
Long, long ago, in the ea.rliest days of computers we bravely set out to translate from one 
natural language, S11.y Russian, into another, say English. At first we claimed that we did not 
have enough storage to hold a dictionary of translations of the words, but as we got larger and 
larger machines that were also faster and faster, it slowly turned out (in spite of 11. lot of public 
demonstrations that they could) that we did not know how to translate from one natural la.nguage 
to another. Indeed, we still do not normally have translators from one computer language, like 
FORTRAN to ADA. You would think that if translation of languages had received all the atten-
tion it has in the past, that such a simple problem as translating from one computer language to a 
closely similar language would be done regularly by machines, but it is not. 
Stated in more general terms we have the pattern recognition problem. How can we 
recognize a pattern? Simple pattern recognition is easy, it is simply template matching. But con-
sider the pattern that Newton recognized, that the falling of an apple a.nd the falling of the moon 
have the same cause. We can find definite algorithms for simple pattern matching, and there is a 
nice one for finding cycles in a string that may start with no repetitions but finally fall into a. 
cycle. One ca.n see from the Newton example that it is not wise to expect that we will ever solve 
the most general pa.ttern rerognition problem. But it is reasonable to attack variou:1 special cases. 
In a sense, it is the recognition of a pattern that is the mark of mental activity in may areas; we 
suddenly see the underlying causes of phenomena. tha.t were earlier thought to be unrelated. 
One might suppose that computer experts would be actively trying to work this field, to 
find bugs, to layout programs in detail, etc. but most people in programming go forward repeating 
the same patterns year after year rather than trying to find out how to make the computer do the 
work. The topic of programs that can inspect and in a certain sense "understand" programs they 
are inspecting, ought to be a central problem, but is seems to be ignored by most people. 
The difficulty comes down to the simple fact that we have little or no understanding of 
how our minds work. Therefore we have trouble trying to get the computer to do many similar 
things. We can often find some algorithm to handle a restricted situation with great ease, and we 
can sometimes find a.n algorithm that will handle most of 11. broad class of situations by using 
some heuristics. Indeed, because the known algorithm that solves all cases is often long, we will 
frequently replace a sure algorithm with a faster heuristic algorithm which will give a good 
answer, but possibly not the best answer, or even possibly fail in a few cases. 
It is a deep philosophical question as to whether or not the human mind can understand 
itself in all its details. We have methods of dealing with complete randomness, namely statistical 
mechanics and and similar tools, and we can deal with regular structures by other tools; but when 
as apparently is true for the human brain there is both a large amount of regularity and at the 
same time a great deal of randomness then our present tools fail us. Furthermore, there is the 
tacit assumption that the method of science, which is reductionism (reduce the complex to a sum 
of its parts and study the parts) can cope with everything. There is a long history of opposition to 
this dominant philosophy which has proved to be so successful in science, and so dismal in areas 
like truth, beauty, and justice. 
Computers have apparently opened a new, exc1tmg area of research that is intimately 
related to our mental side of life. As humans we differ apparently from the other animals because 
of the dominance of our mental aspects. Hence the old Greek aphorism, Know Thyself, is aga.in of 
some interest. We have a new tool for exploring ourselves. 
ARTIFJClAL INTELLIGENCE· l 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the field which examines the ways in which computers might 
be used to do 11intelligent11 things. But "intelligence" is not defined in any agreed upon manner. 
Occasionally you will hear something like, "What Newton and Einstein did." but by that criterion 
almost no one is intelligent, and we all like to think that we are "intelligent11 • It is easy to 
observe however, that intelligent people in similar situations do not always do the same thing. 
Alan Turing once propost'd a test, called the Turing test, that required the exact duplica· 
tion of human activities, excluding the external physical aspects such as appearance and voice, 
but including all mental activities. Such an approach is antiscientific since normal science begins 
with simple things and from them tries to extend to more the complex. Thus a scientific 
approach along these lines would require you to search for the simplest, or close to the simplest, 
program that would exhibit intelligence. Hence if this program were broken up into two distinct 
parts neither part would exhibit intelligence. So far no one has come close to such a program that 
has any universal acceptance. 
The test for intelligence has mainly gone along the lines of getting an "intelligent" result 
from the machine. However, when I observe a small child learning to multiply several decimal 
digit numbers together I have the feeling that the child is thinking, when I do it I feel that it is 
more conditioned response, and when I see a hand calculator do it I feel that it is not thinking at 
all! Thus it may be that thinking is not to be measured by what is produced, but rather how it is 
produced. There is a small sector of Al that is concerned with this approach, but not a lot has 
been accomplished so far as the outsider can judge. 
Most rt'search concentrates on the symbol manipulation side of human behavior and 
excludes the interaction wit.h the real world on a physical basis. The field of ROBOTICS has gra-
du11.lly separated itself from the rest of Al and is centered around handling t.he real world and its 
objects. It is a very important field in the long run, but for the study of what. computers can do 
it is at best tangential since Robotics has so much trouble with what we take to be the simplest of 
actions like walking, grasping, recognizing a particular piece in a general pile of objects, etc. In 
practice these are so hard that most workers in AI have preferred to concentrate on games and 
such highly artificial situations, where the situation is already in symbolic form, 11.nd the goal is 
both clearly stated and is easily recognized. 
It is important for everyone connected in any way with computers to come to terms with 
what they believe computers can do. People are constantly being surprised both by what comput-
ers can do and what they have not been able to do so far. If you believe that computers can 
never think then probably you will always underestimate what they can do, but if you believe 
that of course computers can think then you will attempt to do many things that you will not be 
able to do. Unfortunately , your attitude towards the question, "Can machines think?11 is heavily 
determined by your religious attitudes. 
1t is necessary to stress that when we say 11computers can do" we really mean "what pro-
grammers can write11 • It is generally not a question of what computers can do, it is the question 
of writing programs that are suit11.ble. There are a few researchers who believe that only by signi-
ficantly different kinds of machines can we demonstrate "thinking", and usually they hide behind 
the dem11.nd for machines 11.t least an order of magnitude larger than any currently available. But 
if the above observation is at all right, it is a question of creating a small program that will exhi· 
bit 11intelligence 11 , not one so large that no one knows where the "intelligent" behavior resides. 
The current "expert systems" are examples of the large approach, trying to solve the problem by 
overwhelming the viewer, and not by innate understanding of what "intelligence" means. But 
perhaps they are right in this massive approach, perhaps intelligence is merely a mG.ssive interac· 
tion of essentially simple parts with nothing else there but the simple modes of interaction. 
Observations on great people suggest, however, that "intelligence" is a style of doing things, not 
just more of the same. 
Since so many people begin with hostile attitides it is necessary to begin not with the fun· 
damenta.ls but rather by opposing a number of hasty, ill·thought out attitudes. Thus we use the 
psychological rather than the logical approach to AI. 
A common remark is, 111 would not like to have a computer control my life." It sounds so 
good, but consider the many, many people who are walking around with pacemakers attached to 
their bodies. In a sense their very lives depend on a computer alJ the time! Surely pacemakers, 
which are simple computers, are a good thing as are, and will be, the may aids to people who 
have one or more disabling features. Again, consider the simple stop and go signals. Most of us, 
most of the time, obey these simple devices even when we can see that they have given a poor 
decision! We let ourselves be controlled by computers all the time. As time goes on there will be 
more and more situations where we will be dependent on decisions that come from computers. 
Another common remark is that computers ca.nnot produce any original results, that 
everything must be programmed into them before hand. But consider the results of a geometry 
proving program written long ago. It proved theorems in high school geometry much as students 
do LJudged by the outputs in the two cases). It was given the standard theorem to prove that if 




Most people presented with this will bisect the vertex angle and prove that the two resulting tri· 
angles were congruent, hence corresponding angles are equal. A few will draw a line bisecting the 
base and prove the two triangles congruent, hence the angles are equal. But the computer pro. 
duced the proof 
ABC is congruent to ACB 
Without any construction the tria.ngle is seen to be congruent to itself. This proof was not known 
to the people who wrote the program; but it is generally considered to be the most elegant proof 
of the theorem. What a.re you to say when someone says that a machine cannot produce any· 
thing that is essentially new? 
One solution to this dilemma is to distinguish between 
logical novelty, and 
psychological novelty. 
Without defining these two concepts clearly, what is meant is clear. The computer cannot pro. 
duce logical novelty, (but ca.n we ourselves?), it only produces psychological novelty. That it 
does the later is attested by every programmer who uses machines - the machine is constantly 
doing what it was told and not what you meant and you are surprised at what comes out. But 
before you sell out psychological novelty as being trivial consider that once the definitions and 
postulates of mathematics are given then all the rest is psychological novelty! Although the dis· 
tinction is ueeful for talking about machines, what humans ca.n or cannot do in these terms is 
definitely not clear. 
Another claim is often made that machines <'annot learn. But consider the checker play· 
ing program that was written long ago. Without going into details here, the program is a 
sequence of rules of how to make the next move. These rules have adjustable constants such as 
the weight to be attributed to the value of the control of the center of the boud. By making two 
copies of this program, and chosing one or more of the constants slightly different in the second 
program, the program played a number of games against itself. Since such programs always have 
a random choice when two paths of strategy seem to be about the same in value, the result of say 
ten games will generaly favor one of the two programs over the other. By following up good 
changes and making further changes in the same direction, the program could improve itself by 
experience. By playing many, many games, and systematically varying all the constants, the pro. 
gram gradually became significantly better at playing checkers than the author of the program. 
Surely one can say that the machine learned from experience and thereby improved its perfor. 
ma.nee. 
Some people still object and claim that the learning was all programmed into the ma.chine 
before it stuted, including the random choices made along the way. But it is not as clear as we 
could wish as to whether we a.re not in the same situation, we have some innate features built into 
us, and we a.re taught certain things in school (supplied with subroutines if you wish) and all 
learning is made on top of this. There is an old question in psychology, "You being what you a.re 
at the moment, and the situation being what it is, can you do other than you do?" There is the 
appea.rance of free will, of course, but is it actually there? What tests would you believe? 
It often comes down to a vitalistic theory of intelligence, that some living things have it 
and that no nonliving thing can have it. We have had vitalistic theories before and have had to 
disca.rd many of them. For example, there was long a belief that only living things could make 
organic compounds (hence their name) but chemists synthesized urea and the vitalistic theory of 
chemistry had to be abandoned. At present it is fashionable to believe that the chemistry in the 
human body and the chemistry in the lab are the same chemistry. There was long held the vital-
istic theory that man was essentially different from the rest of life, but if you believe in evolution 
then we a.re not a.s different from the rest of life a.s we sometimes wish to think. Simila.rly, we 
once believed that the earth was the center of the universe, but generaly speaking we have 11.ban· 
doned that "vitalistic" belief that we were is some way essentially different from the rest of the 
universe. Of course the vitalistic belief being, we think, often wrong in the pa.st does not prove 
that it will a.gain be proved wrong when some people still believe in a vita.li.!tic theory of thinking. 
Still, it is a bit embarrassing to assert a vitali.!tic theory of intelligence in these days of rapid 
scientific progress. 
Let us turn to another aspect of huma.ns that we seem, in this culture, to value highly, 
and that is originality. Originality is a fa.ncy word that means, in clothes for example, being dif-
ferent but not too different. It is much the same in science, the original thinker has different 
ideas from those of the others, but not too different lest he be called a crackpot! The topic of ori· 
ginal creation by computers has been attacked in a number of ways. We have tried composing 
music by computers, following out the rules of the form of music and letting random numbers 
decide which path to choose when the rules no longer apply. The results a.re mixed to say the 
lea.st. To the author of these pages, who by no means is a trained musician, what has been done 
occasionally has local interest, but not large sea.le interest. It seems that the mere randomness of 
the compositions have a certain novelty, a certain interest, but it seldom is music you would like 
to listen closely to for long times. As background music, possibly. As an aid to composition com· 
puters have more promise. 
Indeed, continuing on the topic of mu.sic, it is not hard to think of music as merely a 
sound track, a varying voltage in time. Therefore, upon sampling at a high frequency so that the 
high frequencies you want are accurately reproduced , and digitizing the height of the voltage at 
each sample, one has the matching concept of 11. string of numbers as representing the music. It is 
not difficult to reverse the process and convert these numbers into voltages and thus reproduce 
the original sound. Modern recording goes almost immediately to the digital form, and only at 
the last moment, in digital music, is the voltage converted to the analog form and fed to the loud 
speakers. We ran, therefore, ask the question of creating the numbers from a formula without the 
original music. And we have done exactly this. Much of the music you hear in the background 
of commercials has no source other than computer programs. In a very real sense, we are now in 
the position to make any sounds that can possibly exist, whether or not a real physical instrument 
could make them or not. Thus the composer has total freedom of selection of the sound. And the 
conductor, by replaying and altering the formula and timings, can get any particular rendition of 
the music desired. In a sense we ha.ve reached the ultimate in music, no further improvements 
can be made beyond trivial extensions of complete command over the composition and production 
of music. The problem is not in the production, it is in the selection; of all the "music" that can 
possibly exist, which do we want to produce? Many of us believe that it is the same in the study 
of intelligence, it is not the machine that is defective and lacking, it is the programming. 
Just because programmers have not programmed computers to think, does not mean that comput-
ers cannot think; it may mea.n that programmers are incompetent. 
On the other side, just because you wish to believe that computers can be programmed to think 
does not mean that they can . 
SIMULATJON 1 
We have repeatedly said that the computer is merely a symbol manipulator, and the 
manipulations done do not involve the meanings we attach to the symbols. This means that we 
can arrange a program to manipulate symbols in any fashion we please. H we c11.n characterize 
some situation in suitable symbols, and write a program to manipulate these symbols in patterns 
that correspond to the changes in the given situation, then we have a simulation of the situation. 
Thus we can simulate any situation where we can assign suitable symbols and write the 
evolving relationships between the symbols. In classical mechanical situations these rules of mani-
pulation are just the rules of mechanics. Indeed, one can look at the whole of your education as 
being merely courses in the relationships between symbols in various fields. The various courses 
give the specific rules for the specific field of study. Jn this view, the computer is the prime tool 
for understanding the world - it can in principle simulate anything you can describe. 
This fact is rapidly changing 1he nature of science. Where once we did almost all verifi-
cation in the lab, we now simulate the situation and from this decide what to do. or course, this 
does not mean that we never look at rl'ahty in 11. real laboratory, it means however that we look 
less oft.en directly and more often mdirectly 1 hrough simulations. Simulations are often fa.r faster 
(no matter how slow prgramming may appear to be, :setting up laboratory equipment is a lot 
slower and more costly on the average), far cheaper, and can h11.ndle ideal situation:s that the lab 
cannot. Thus in running a sequence of simulations of electron beams, ] could simulate a beam 
with no space charge which nailed down the extreme point that could not be reached by 11.ny real 
beam in the laboratory. lndeed, one of the great strengths of simulation as compared with real 
experiments is the ability to do extreme experiments. To this day outer space is a more perfect 
vacuum than any we can create in the laboratory, so when simulating on earth a missile in space 
the simulation can do what the laboratory could not do. As a result we now do most experiments 
on computers rather than in the laboratory. This is a tremendou:s change from classical science to 
what was once called medieval science (which distained to look at reality)! 
This change is most apparent in science laboratories and in engineering practice. In the 
social sciences the tradition of laboratory experiments was not as long established and suffered 
from the obvious fact that we are often reluctant to experiment on hum11.ns directly. With com-
puters we can now simulate many experiments in the social sciences. 
We not only use computers to simulate whole laboratories, we use them to direct the 
actions in the lab, to gather the resulting data, and to analyse the data. In some situations this is 
done "on line" meaning that the data is gathered, 11.nalysed, and a decision is made as to what 
stimuli to try next on the subject. This feedback arrangement is faster, 11.nd far more flexible, 
than the :slow human process we once used in social science laboratories. 
One of the results of this computerization of the laboratory is that we can now construct 
far more complex theories than we ever could in the past, simulate special cases of these ~heories, 
find their strengths and weaknesses, and advance our ideas more rapidly. This is true not only in 
the more formal sciences, but in such vague areas as the subject of originality. We are not sure 
what we me11.n by that word, but if you have 11. theory of how to be original then we can probably 
simulate it and, again probably, show that your theory is inadequate. But hopefully the inade-
quacy will point the way to an elaboration or change of your current theory. In this way we c11.n 
study complex situation:s that in the past were practically beyond study. 
Most important simulations take weeks, months, or even years to create, and hence a.re 
beyond discus:sion in any detail in this course. We must be content to give very simple, easily 
understood examples of the main kinds of simulations that are in current use. An exception a.re 
the simulators for teaching flying to pilots. Such trainers a.re more effective per hour used than is 
real flights. They can simulate dangerous situations that you would hesitate to try in practice. 
They a.re significantly cheaper per hour of use. We have such trainers in many fields, and their 
use will undoubtedly expand. One of their virtues is that we can simulate many different varia-
tions of the proposed item and try them out on real people. The flexibility, as well as the cheap-
ness of simulators makes them a natural field of expansion. We now turn to setting up some very 
simple simulations to show the simple ideas involved. In real simulations you must have a 
detailed knowledge of all the technical details of the field of application. 
We begin with a very simple, discrete simulation. Suppose we have a number of identical 
pieces of equipment in the field. Occasionally such equipment fails and we must do something 
depending on the nature of the failure. The failure may be catastrophic so that repair is not feasi-
ble, or it may be a partial failure and suitable for repair. We suppose that we have a list of the 
last 100 failures, the time the equipment lasted in the field, and the kind of failure. We must also 
have some new machines coming into use. We suppose that we have a constant rate of new 
equipment coming in. We also rmppose that we know the time through the repair shop to get the 
new equipment installed and running. Thus we also have a list of the lengths of time spent in the 
repair shop for the two types of activity, repair of old and preparation of new equipment. 
We begin with a reasonable distribution of equipment in the field and we assign by ran-
dom methods the time to failure of each. We can do this by taking a random number from 00 to 
99 and looking at our list for the time to failure. Similarly, we assume a distribution, perhaps 
none, waiting for service in the shop and assign corresponding times to each. We now look at the 
first time something is going to happen, a failure, a release from the shop to the field, or a new 
piece of equipment coming in. We then process this item and assign, if suitable, a time to the 
next stage in its history. We procede, step by step, repeating this simple process, ]ook for the 
next event, process it by moving it forward with its new time selected at random from the known 
past histories. We, of course, keep a running record of what we are interested in, such as the 
length of the queue at the repair shop, the number of units working in the field, etc. In this way 
we can get a feel for what is going on and verify the simulation against pa.st history. 
Next we imagine 11. change, say in the rate of incoming equipment. What wiH happen? 
How many will be in use and how many in the queue of the repair shop? If the queue is going to 
be long then maybe we also hn.ve to increase the capacity of the repair shop. We can, using this 
same simulation, merely increase the rate of inputs, simulate what is likely to happen, and we can 
answer the perenial question, "What will happen? 11 By this trivial simulation we can anticipate 
serious troubles before they occur. 
We can elaborate the model easily. For example, suppose that there a.re two different 
forms of breakdown, each with its list of repair times in the shop, as well as the total failure and 
consequent discard. As we become familiar with the model we can make other measurements and 
more detailed simulations. In principle there is nothing we cannot simulate if we have the data 
and information we need to do the simulation. Notice that the main assmption is that the future 
wiU be like the past, that failures a.re independent (though we could handle correlations if you 
wished), and that we understand the main factors involved in the simulation. If we miss any, then 
of course the simulation will be invalid. 
This method of using the actual past records and selecting a.t ra.ndom from them ma.y be 
ca11ed direct simulation as contrasted with the attempt to model the failure times with some 
theoretical model. The simple, direct modelling we a.re suggesting can often be done by hand 
using at most some file cards as aids to the simulation to keep track, by sorting, the next event, 
and a few tally sheets for records of what you a.re interested in. The value of such simple, trivial 
simulations can be very great, but people seem to think that they need to have big computers and 
elaborate programs to do them - simple hand calculations often are faster! The effect of an 
increased capacity for repair can be seen; at first there are more machines in the field, but as time 
goes on we must have a equilibrium between those being discarded and those arriving - but the 
capital investment in the machines not being used because they are waiting for repair may justify 
increasing the capacity of the repair shop so that often it has idle time! This fact causes top 
management to be annoyed until they are brought to understand, often by simulations, that try-
ing to keep the repair service working all the time results in long queues and idle machines wait-
ing for repairs. Queuing theory is often not obvious and simulations can illuminate what is going 
on better than can a lot of equations when the person to be convinced is not inclined towards 
mathematics. 
Let us extend our ideas slightly. We picked 100 events to make the discussion easy, but 
suppose we have only 43 events available. We want to select from these equally likely. How to 
do it? Easy! We select our number from 00 to 99 as before. If it is greater than 85, (86 is twice 
43) we discard the random number and try again. Of course in principle we might have to try a 
number of times before we get a success. When we have it we test if it is less than 43, (we want 
00 to 42), and if so we keep it, if it is larger we subtract 48 and then have 11. number less that 43 
and again can go ahe11.d. This is a simple way of getting, with some efficiency, the needed random 
numbers. The efficiency of this reandom number generation method can easily be computed, but 
is of small interest in a first glance at simulation. 
As 11. complete aside, suppose you want a reliable 50-50 choice and you have av11.ilable 
only 11. possibly biassed source of two choices, heads and tails. Consider tossing 11. coin twice. The 





HT p(l-p) TH (1-p)p 
We note that HT and TH have the same probabilities, hence we ignore the other two outcomes 
and if they occur we try another double toess until one of the two does occur. Then we have 
equally likely outcomes from 11. possibly biassed source. For a slightly biassed coin you will make 
slightly over four tossses (two double tosses) to get one decision. 
In general you see the need for random number tables; you may think that you can make 
up random numbers but experience shows that almost no one can do it with any significant bias. 
With random numbers many non-deterministic situations can be explored easily via such direct 
simulations. We can even study deterministic situations when they have some corresponding ran-
dom analogy by solving the random version and claiming that the solution for the deterministic 
situation must be the same. Such situations have been given the colorful name Monte Carlo simu-
lations for the obvious reason. 
SIMULATIONS 2 
In studying discrete situations we often have the model that failures occur at a 
constant rate but at random times - meaning, typically, that no matter how long you have gone 
without a failure the probability of a failure in the next short interval of time is the same! This is 
very common - especially with electronic equipment. One needs to have a method of getting ran-
dom numbers from the corresponding distribution, the negative exponential. Similarly, may other 
distributions may occur in modelling a random situation. Here we are not using lists of past 
failures, but are constructing the times of events from their distributions. 
There is the further class of simulations where the thing itself is continuous. For exam-
ple, we generally imagine a space vehicle as going through a continuous space in continuous time. 
In such situations we generally quantize time (use discrete steps in time). We set up the differen-
tial equations that describe the motion from the position 11.nd forces 11.cting on the space vehicle, 
and from them move the vehicle forward a small unit in time. Jn this new position we again com-
pute the forces and again the new position, etc. until we come to the end of the trajectory. Here 
11. computer is very handy and the same pattern of operations are repeatedly done again and again 
- it is the same formula at. each step, only the details differ in position and in forces acting at that 
moment and that time. 
Nature has apparently given us 11. description of the world in terms of differential equa-
tions since so many of our fundamental laws are stated in the form of 11. differential equation -
meaning 11. local instantaneous description. Hence the numerical solution of differential equations 
looms very large in simulations that try to handle continuous situations, and the field is highly 
developed and very mathematical. Yet this same tool solves many different kinds of simulations -
it does not matter whether you are interested in the growth of bacteria in a culture, the motion of 
a space vehicle, or the way electrons flow in 11. TV tube, the method of solution is much the same. 
It is in the setting up of the differential equations that the difference arises - each field has its spe-
cial knowledge and from this you write out the governing equations and the starting conditions -
the same library program is then used to solve all this rich variety of problems. 
Not only do we simulate particular situations, it is now true that we can simulate 11. wind 
tunnel with your particular item in it on 11. computer better than we can actually run it in the 
wind tunnel - in this field we have almost completely replaced experiments with simulations! We 
also simulate chemical bonding and the structure of compounds in the computer before going to 
the lab to try to make them. As time goes on, and we have increasingly firm foundations for vari-
ous fields of research and engineering, we can use a computer to replace a laboratory - we have 
changed the very way we work! Of course we should occasionally look at reality to check the 
validit) of our modelling, but as experince builds up we need to look less and less often - until 
some people will believe that the model is reality and cease to look at reality. That is a danger, 
but reasonable prudence should protect us against that folly . 
A presentation of the elementss of the topic of differential equations and their numerical 
solution follows - depending on the response of the class how much can be covered. 
